Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Due Process - The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine - Weinberger v. Salfi by Woffinden, Arlen D.
BYU Law Review
Volume 1976 | Issue 2 Article 10
5-1-1976
Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Due Process
- The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine -
Weinberger v. Salfi
Arlen D. Woffinden
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Fourteenth Amendment Commons
This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Arlen D. Woffinden, Constitutional Law-Equal Protection-Due Process - The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine - Weinberger v. Salfi, 1976
BYU L. Rev. 565 (1976).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1976/iss2/10
Constitutional Law-EQUAL PROTECTION-DUE PROCESS- 
THE IRREBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION DOCTRINE- Weinberger u. Salfi, 
422 U.S. 749 (1975). 
Appellee Concetta Salfi married Londo Salfi in May 1972. 
Although in apparent good health a t  the time of the marriage, 
Londo suffered a fatal heart attack 6 months later. Concetta then 
applied to the Social Security Administration for widow's insur- 
ance benefits and for child's insurance benefits for her daughter 
by a previous marriage. Both applications were denied for the 
reason that section 416 of the Social Security Act1 excludes from 
receipt of benefits surviving wives and stepchildren who had been 
related to the deceased wage earner for less than 9 months prior 
to his death. 
Concetta and her daughter then filed an action in district 
court challenging the constitutionality of section 416. A three- 
judge district court certified the case as a class action, found the 
duration-of-relationship requirements to constitute irrebuttable 
presumptions which violated the due process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, and granted declaratory and injunctive relief and 
darn age^.^ The Supreme Court reversed, finding that  the 
duration-of-relationship requirements were not irrebuttable pre- 
sumptions in violation of due process; rather, treating the claim 
as founded upon the equal protection clause, the Court found that 
the requirements were valid since they were rationally related to 
a legitimate legislative ~b jec t ive .~  
- - 
1. 42 U.S.C. § 416(c)(5) (Supp. IV, 1974) defines "widow" as "the surviving wife of 
an individual, but only if . . . (5) she was married to him for a period of not less than 
nine months immediately prior to the day on which he died . . . ." 42 U.S.C. 9 416(e)(2) 
(Supp. IV, 1974) defines "child" as "(2) a stepchild who has been such stepchild for.  . . 
(if the insured individual is deceased) not less than nine months immediately preceeding 
the day on which such individual died . . . ." 
2. Salfi v. Weinberger, 373 F. Supp. 961, 965-66 (N.D. Cal. 1974), reu'd, 422 U.S. 749 
(1975). 
3. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 777, 780-81 (1975). The Court first treated the 
jurisdiction issue, finding jurisdiction over the claims raised by Concetta and her daugh- 
ter, but not over the class action. Id. a t  756-67. The district court, 373 F. Supp. at  966, 
based jurisdiction upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970), which confers jurisdiction on the federal 
courts to hear claims arising under the Constitution. The Supreme Court, however, read 
9 205(h) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1970), as precluding federal 
jurisdiction under § 1331 to hear constitutional challenges to the Act. According to the 
majority, any constitutional challenge to the Act arises under the Act and is subject to 
the requirements of § 205(g) of the Social Security Act, which requires exhaustion of 
administrative remedies. Since none of the class members had even applied to the Admin- 
istrator for such remedies, the Court dismissed the class claim. With respect to the named 
appellees who had at  least applied, however, the Court found that further administrative 
exhaustion would be fruitless since the Administrator could not decide their only claim, 
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Legislation creates an irrebuttable or conclusive presump- 
tion%hen it provides that fact A (the basic fact) is conclusive 
evidence of the existence of fact B (the presumed f a c t ) . T h e  
practical effect of a conclusive presumption is to make fact B 
irrelevant: when a statute conditions a benefit upon a presumed 
fact (B) which follows directly upon proof of a basic fact (A), the 
benefit is actually conditioned solely upon proof of the basic fact 
( A )  .' Since the legislature intended to condition the benefit upon 
fact B,' courts have required that the presumption be factually 
which was the constitutionality of the Act. Thus, the Court found two parts to the exhaus- 
tion of remedies requirements of 42 U.S.C. 8 405(g) (1970). First, it absolutely required 
that the Administrator be given an opportunity to fashion an administrative remedy. The 
class claim failed this first requirement. Second, it required exhaustion of administrative 
remedies, which requirement may be waived by the Administrator or by the Court if it 
appears that such exhaustion would be fruitless. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 44 U.S.L.W. 
4224, 4226-27 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1976). 
The majority's interpretation of 5 205(h) of the Social Security Act was probably ill- 
founded, as the dissent argues, 422 U.S. a t  789-99 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Johnson 
v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 367 (1974) (holding that a challenge to a statute's constitution- 
ality arises not under the statute, but under the Constitution). But see Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 44 U.S.L.W. 4224, 4227 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1976) (following Salfi). 
4. The terms "irrebuttable presumption" and "conclusive presumption" are inter- 
changeable. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). 
Rebuttable presumptions are evidentiary devices that merely shift the burden of 
proof. See 9 J. WIGMORE, VIDENCE 5 2490 (3d ed. 1940). Irrebuttable presumptions are 
generally considered by commentators as rules of substantive law rather than rules of 
evidence. See id. 5 2492; 4 J .  WIGMORE, VIDENCE 5 1353 (Chadbourn rev. 1972); Brosman, 
The Statutory Presumption, 5 TUL. L. REV. 17, 24 (1930). Courts, however, have not agreed 
upon whether the irrebuttable presumption is a rule of evidence or a rule of law. See cases 
cited in Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 449, 462 
n.69 (1975). Compare Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975) and Mourning v. Family 
Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973) with Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 
U.S. 632 (1974) and Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973). 
5. 4 J. WIGMORE, VIDENCE 5 1353 (Chadbourn rev. 1972). For example, a statute 
providing that any gift of a material part of a decedent's estate made within 6 years of 
the decedent's death shall be construed to have been made in contemplation of death 
creates a conclusive presumption. After proof of the basic fact (that a gift was made within 
6 years of death), the presumed fact (that the gift was made in contemplation of death) 
is conclusively inferred. The example is taken from Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 
(1926) (invalidating the presumption). 
6. 9 J .  WIGMORE, VIDENCE 5 2492 (3d Ed. 1940). 
7. Some legislation creating conclusive presumptions sets out the presumed fact or 
legislative purpose in the legislation itself. Mortmain statutes, such as the one described 
in note 5 supra, are good examples. For most legislation, however, the Court must discover 
or hypothesize a purpose. For example, a statute requiring all motorists to signal before 
turning may be found to have automotive safety as its purpose. The statute can be 
attacked for creating an irrebuttable presumption since it conclusively presumes that 
turning without signaling is unsafe. The presumption is counterfactual and the classifica- 
tion overinclusive since a t  a deserted corner a signal would not make a turn any safer. 
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precise or that the classification created by the basic fact be 
coterminous with that created by the presumed fact. 
Irrebuttable presumptions based upon imprecise classifica- 
tions have been found by the Supreme Court to violate the due 
process c l a u ~ e . ~  The constitutional standard recently articulated 
by the Court is that if it is not "necessarily or universally true in 
fact" that the presumed fact follows from the basic fact, and 
there exist "reasonable alternative means of making the crucial 
determination," then the irrebuttable presumption denies due 
process of law.9 
A. Early Development of the Irrebuttable Presumption 
Doctrine 
In the 1920's and 1930's' the irrebuttable presumption doc- 
trine was used by the Court to strike down classifications in the 
tax laws.I0 Because of the doctrine's substantive due process over- 
Almost all legislative classifications are imprecise if the purpose of the legislation is drawn 
narrowly enough. If the purpose in the example is found to be broader-automotive safety, 
certainty of application, ease of administration-imprecision would be more difficult to 
find. In Salfi, 422 U.S. a t  776-77, Justice Rehnquist draws the congressional purpose to 
include efficiency of administration. 
Both the equal protection doctrine and the irrebuttable presumption doctrine evalu- 
ate the fit between means and purpose, making the judicial evaluation of legislative 
purpose extremely important. On the problems of determining legislative purpose see 
Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative 
Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95, 115-31; Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in 
Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205,1212-23 (1970); Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 
Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a 
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 43-47 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther, 
Newer Equal Protection]; Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Foreword: Toward a 
Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1973); Note, 
Of Classifications and Presumptions: The Social Security Act and the Illegitimate Child, 
43 U.M.K.C.L. REV. 248, 252 (1974); Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality and Equal 
Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123, 128-38, 154 (1972). 
8. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); Vlandis 
v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Heiner v. Donnan, 
285 U.S. 312 (1932). 
9. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U S .  441, 452 (1973). 
10. A typical case is Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932), in which the Court 
invalidated a federal estate tax provision that any gift in excess of $5,000 made within 2 
years of the donor's death would be deemed to have been made in contemplation of death 
and included in the donor's estate. The Court stated: 
[Wlhether . . . the . . . presumption be treated as a rule of evidence or of 
substantive law, it constitutes an attempt, by legislative fiat, to enact into 
existence a fact which here does not, and cannot be made to exist in actuality 
. . . . This Court has held more than once that a statute creating a presumption 
which operates to deny a fair opportunity to rebut it violates the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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tones," however, it inspired criticism from both on12 and off3 the 
Court. Later holdings by the Court attempted to restrict the doc- 
trine's impact." With the general repudiation of substantive due 
process review,15 the irrebuttable presumption doctrine became 
almost entirely dormant" until after 1965, when it again appeared 
as a means of invalidating classificatory legislation.17 
Id. a t  329; see Handy v. Delaware Trust Co., 285 U.S. 352 (1932); Schlesinger v. Wiscon- 
sin, 270 U.S. 230 (1926); Note, The Right to Rebut: Conclusive Presumptions in Civil 
Cases, 6 CONN. L. REV. 725, 726-28 (1974). 
11. Although couched in procedural due process terms of a right to present evidence 
rebutting a presumption, it is clear that the challenge in most irrebuttable presumption 
claims is a substantive due process challenge to the legislature's authority to condition 
benefits or burdens upon the chosen criteria. Compare Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. a t  463, 
467-69 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) with id. a t  455 (Marshall, J., concurring). Claimants 
in such cases do not argue that they are incorrectly classified according to the law, but 
that the law itself incorrectly classifies. They are, therefore, seeking a restraint on legisla- 
tive abuse. Cf. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 
161 (1908); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
12. See, e.g., Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312, 332-51 (1932) (Stone, J., dissenting); 
Hoeper v. Tax Comm'n, 284 U.S. 206, 218-21 (1931) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Schlesinger 
v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 241-42 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
13. See, e.g., 39 HARV. L. REV. 1096 (1926); 41 YALE L.J. 906 (1932); 35 YALE L.J. 1011 
(1926). 
14. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (presumption 
found to be a declaration of legislative findings or a rule of law); Helvering v. City Bank 
Farmers Trust Co., 296 U.S. 85 (1935) (presumption sustained as necessary to prevent tax 
avoidance); United States v. Provident Trust Co., 291 U.S. 272 (-1934) (preference for 
finding presumption rebuttable rather than conclusive). 
15. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537-38 (1934); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union 
v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 534-37 (1949). 
16. In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 543-44 (1942), Chief Justice Stone, in a 
concurring opinion, apparently would have preferred the irrebuttable presumption doctine 
over the equal protection doctrine used by the majority to invalidate the legislation. The 
doctrine was only vaguely implicit in Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1961) (invalidating 
presumption that Communist party member shares unlawful aims of organization if he 
joined or remained a member after swearing allegiance to Constitution); Slochower v. 
Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956) (invalidating presumption of disloyalty when 
a city employee failed to testify before a legislative hearing); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 
U S .  183 (1952) (invalidating disloyalty presumption for members of certain organiza- 
tions). 
17. In Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89,96-97 (1965), a provision of the Texas constitu- 
tion that denied voting residency status to all United States servicemen who were not 
originally Texas residents was invalidated for violating the equal protection clause. But 
the Court also observed, id. a t  96, that the provision created an irrebuttable presumption 
similar to that found in Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932), one of the tax cases of 
the substantive due process era, discussed in note 10 supra. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 
(1971), involved a Georgia statute that required automatic suspension of vehicle registra- 
tion and driver's license for any uninsured motorist involved in an accident who did not 
post bond for the accident damage. The Court found the purpose of the statute to be the 
protection of faultless accident victims from judgment-proof defendants and held that 
fault could not be conclusively presumed since due process required a hearing on fault 
before suspension of a license. Id. a t  540. 
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B. Recent Cases Employing the Irrebuttable Presumption 
Doctrine 
The 1972 case of Stanley u. I1linoislR involved an equal pro- 
tection challenge to an Illinois statutory plan whereby illegiti- 
mate children automatically became wards of the state upon the 
death of their mother; the unwed father was presumed to be an 
unfit parent.lg The Court, apparently unwilling to base its deci- 
sion solely upon the due process clause,20 used both a due process 
and an equal protection analysis. After stating that parental 
rights are protected by due process  guarantee^,^^ the Court dis- 
cussed the conclusive presumption of parental unfitness and 
found that it denied due process to unwed fathemZ2 In addition, 
since the presumption violated due process rights of unwed fa- 
thers but not married fathers, the Court found an equal protec- 
tion violation .23 
In Vlandis v. Kline,24 the Court struck down a Connecticut 
law that fixed a student's residency status as his residence at the 
time of application for admission to the state university system.25 
The students argued that the law created an irrebuttable pre- 
sumption and claimed a constitutional right to rebut the nonresi- 
dency presumption with evidence of bona fide re~idence .~~ The
IS. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
19. The Juvenile Court Act 5 1-14, [I9651 Ill. Laws 2586 (amended 1973) defined 
parents as "the father and mother of a legitimate child, or the survivor of them, or the 
natural mother of an illegitimate child, and includes any adoptive parent." ILL. REV. STAT. 
ch. 37, 5 702-1 (1973) provides that proceedings to make children wards of the state "may 
be instituted . . . concerning boys and girls who are . . . dependent . . . ." Id. 5 702-5 
defines dependent as "[tlhose who are dependent include any minor . . . (a) who is 
without a parent, guardian or legal custodian . . . ." 
20. The due process irrebuttable presumption claim was not developed by either the 
courts or the parties in the state courts. Therefore, the Supreme Court was presented only 
with an equal protection claim and felt somewhat constrained to stay within the plead- 
ings. See 405 U.S. a t  659 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
21. 405 U.S. a t  651-52. 
22. Id. a t  653-58. 
23. Id. a t  649, 658. Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent, objected to the majority's use 
of the strict scrutiny equal protection test as a safeguard for all "important" rights. The 
rationale was apparently espoused by the majority to bring the decision within the plead- 
ings. Id. at 660; see note 20 supra. 
24. 412 U.S. 441 (1973). 
25. No. 5, 5 126(a)(2), [I9711 Conn. Pub. Acts 2237 (repealed 1973) provided that 
an unmarried student was a nonresident if his legal address at any time during the year 
prior to application for admission was outside the state. P 126(a)(3) provided that a 
married student was a nonresident if his legal address at the time of application for 
admission was outside of the state. 8 125(a)(5) provided that the classifications were 
permanent as long as the student attended the university system. 
26. 412 U.S. a t  445-46. 
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Court stated that conclusive presumptions "have long been disfa- 
vored under the Due Process Clause" and were unconstitutional 
unless "necessarily or universally true in fact."27 Since the resi- 
dency presumption was not necessarily true, and other means of 
determining residency were available to the state, the presump- 
tion violated the due process clause.28 
The third case, United States Department of Agriculture v. 
M ~ r r y , ~ ~  involved a challenge to section 5(b) of the Food Stamp 
which presumed food stamp ineligibility for any household 
that included a member over age 18 who had been claimed as a 
dependent for the previous year by a taxpayer living in another 
h o ~ s e h o l d . ~ ~  The Court found that the purpose of the statute, to 
assist the needy while preventing college students who were sup- 
ported by their parents from receiving food stamps, was not ra- 
tionally related to the tax deduction classification. Since the clas- 
sification produced a presumption that was often contrary to fact, 
it violated due 
In Cleveland Board of Education v. L a F l e ~ r , ~ ~  plaintiffs chal- 
lenged school board regulations that required pregnant school- 
27. The Court stated: 
In sum, since Connecticut purports to be concerned with residency in allo- 
cating the rates for tuition and fees in its university system, it is forbidden by 
the Due Process Clause to deny an individual the resident rates on the basis of 
a permanent and irrebuttable presumption of nonresidence, when that pre- 
sumption is not necessarily or universally true in fact, and when the State has 
reasonable alternative means of making the crucial determination. 
Id. a t  452. The standard as articulated in Vlandis is the strongest statement of the irre- 
buttable presumption test found in recent cases. In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger 
stated that the majority had transferred the compelling state interest test to due process 
adjudication. Id. at  460. Justice Rehnquist argued in dissent that the Court was returning 
to a doctrine with strong substantive due process overtones previously repudiated by the 
Court. Id. a t  463, 467-68. Justice White concurred in the judgment, but would have used 
Justice Marshall's sliding scale equal protection model to invalidate the challenged legis- 
lation. Id. at  458-59. 
28. Id. at  452. 
29. 413 U.S. 508 (1973). 
30. 7 U.S.C. 8 2014(b) (1970). 
31. The section states in pertinent part: 
Any household which includes a member who has reached his eighteenth birth- 
day and who is claimed as a dependent child for Federal income tax purposes 
by a taxpayer who is not a member of an eligible household, shall be ineligible 
to participate in any food stamp program . . . during the tax period such de- 
pendency is claimed and for a period of one year after expiration of such tax 
period. 
Id. 
32. 413 U.S. a t  512, 514. 
33. 414 U.S. 632 (1974). 
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teachers to take leave without pay before reaching the fifth or 
sixth month of pregnancy. Applying the conclusive presumption 
analysis of Vlandis, the Court found that the purpose of the regu- 
lation was to keep unfit teachers out of the classroom and that 
the rule conclusively presumed that every teacher who reaches 
the fifth or sixth month of pregnancy is unfit to teach." The rule 
thus created an imprecise classification that was not necessarily 
true and which the Court would not uphold. 
Each of these recent cases produced vigorous dissents.3s The 
dissenters argued that the irrebuttable presumption doctrine was 
improperly employed since the equal protection doctrine was 
more a p p r ~ p r i a t e , ~ ~  that the application of the irrebuttable pre- 
sumption doctrine distorted the results that would have been 
34. Two justifications for the rule were offered by the school board. First, by allowing 
the board to know exactly when new teachers would be needed, the rule preserved the 
continuity of the educational process. The Court found the rule to bear no rational rela- 
tionship to such a goal. 414 U S .  a t  640-43. The second asserted justification, that the rule 
operated to keep unfit teachers out of the classroom, was struck down under the irrebut- 
table presumption test. Id. a t  643-48. Justice Powell found both justifications irrational 
under equal protection standards. Id. at  653 (Powell, J., concurring). 
35. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented in Vlandis, Murry, and 
LaFleur. Justices Rehnquist and Powell took no part in Stanley, but Chief Justice Burger 
also dissented in that case. Justice Powell dissented in Murry and concurred only in the 
result in LaFleur. 
For a case in which the dissenters were in the majority see Mourning v. Family 
Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U S .  356 (1973), wherein a regulation promulgated to imple- 
ment the Truth in Lending Act was challenged on irrebuttable presumption grounds. The 
Federal Reserve Board had promulgated the Four Installment rule, 12 C.F.R. 226.2(k) 
(1975 rev.) under authority of § 105 of the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (1970). 
The rule required, among other things, the disclosure of cash price, the amount of finance 
charges and other charges, and the rate of the charges on all installment contracts extend- 
ing over 4 months. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 449 F.2d 235 (1971), held that the 
Four Installment rule constituted an unconstitutional conclusive presumption since the 
rule required truth in lending disclosures on any installment contract extending over 4 
months whether it involved credit or not. The regulation therefore created a conclusive 
presumption that all installment contracts extending over 4 months involved credit and 
should be regulated. Since the presumption was often counterfactual and considerably 
overinclusive, the Fifth Circuit invalidated the regulation. An alternate ground for the 
decision was that the Federal Reserve Board overstepped the legislative grant of authority. 
The Supreme Court reversed, adopting an equal protection approach, and found that 
the rule 
was intended as a prophylactic measure; it does not presume that all creditors 
who are within its ambit assess finance charges, but, rather, imposes a disclo- 
sure requirement on all members of a defined class . . . . 
411 U.S. a t  377 (1973). Whether the contracts involved credit was irrelevant to the Court 
since the Court found a rule of substantive law rather than a conclusive evidentiary 
presumption. 
36. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U S .  441, 460 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Cleve- 
land Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U S .  632,652 (Powell, J., concurring only in the result). 
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produced by equal protection analysis,37 and that the irrebuttable 
presumption doctrine threatened to become "an engine of de- 
struction for countless legislative  judgment^."^^ 
C. Welfare Legislation and the  Equal Protection Clause 
As the least specific and potentially the most expansive guar- 
antees in the Constitution, the equal protection and due process 
clauses lie at  the roots of the debates over separation of powers 
and judicial activism versus judicial restraint.39 Consequently, 
the Supreme Court feels compelled to review equal protection 
claims upon articulated neutral  principle^.^^ Thus, before invali- 
dating legislation under the equal protection banner, the Court 
generally requires that the means employed by the legislature to 
achieve a legitimate end be wholly irrational."' However, when 
constitutionally protected fundamental rightsa are threatened or 
suspect  classification^^^ are used by the legislature, the Court 
37. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U S .  441, 459 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
38. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 772 (1975); see Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. 
LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 657-59 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. a t  652 (Powell, J., 
concurring); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U S .  441, 462 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
39. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL L W 484-85 (9th 
ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL L W; Dixon, The 'New' Sub- 
stantive Due Process and the Democratic Ethic: A Prolegomenon, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV. 
44-45. 
40. The term "neutral principles" is used to mean constitutionally founded principles 
that may be logically and justly applied to a wide range of factual situations with coherent 
results. The search for neutral principles to guide Fourteenth Amendment review has 
produced considerable comment. E.g., Barrett, Judicial Supervision of Legislative Classi- 
fications-A More Modest Role for Equal Protection?, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV. 89 [herein- 
after cited as Barrett, A More Modest Role]; Dixon, The 'New' Substantive Due Process 
and the Democratic Eth,ic: A Prolegomenon, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV. 43; Goodpaster, The Con- 
stitution and Fundamental Rights, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 479 (1973); Gunther, Newer Equal 
Protection, supra note 7; Nowak, Realigning the ~ tanddrds  of Review Under the Equal 
Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEO. L.J. 
1071 (1974); Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. CN. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 269 
(1975); Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in 
the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1973); Wilkinson, The Supreme 
Court, The Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 
VA. L. REV. 945 (1975); Forum: Equal Protection and the Burger Court, 2 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 645 (1975). 
41. See, e.g., North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 
U S .  156,165-166 (1973); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U S .  483,488 (1955); Railway 
Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Barrett, A More Modest Role 92, 122- 
29. 
42. As used by the Court, "constitutionally protected rights" and "fundamental 
rights" are synonymous terms, meaning those rights "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed 
by the Constitution." San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U S .  1,33-34 (1973). 
The literature discussing the Court's treatment of the fundamental rights category is 
massive. See, e.g., Barrett, A More Modest Role 91-92, 108-21. 
43. See, e.g., Barrett, Judicial Supervision of Legislative Classifications-A More 
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imposes a strict-and usually fatalu-scrutiny requiring compel- 
ling governmental  justification^.^^ 
Although at  one time the Court hinted that rights to welfare 
payments might be fundamental rights,46 it has since consistently 
applied only minimal scrutiny and granted the legislature broad 
classifying powers in welfare legi~lation.~' In reviewing welfare 
legislation that involves no suspect classification or fundamental 
right, the Court's inquiry has been limited to whether a reason- 
able legislator could have rationally concluded that the particular 
legislation would promote the desired objective? 
The Supreme Court recently, but temporarily, departed from 
this traditional deference, striking down welfare legislation in two 
cases: United States Department of Agriculture v. M ~ r r y ~ ~  and 
Jimenez v. Weinberge~~O Under the traditional equal protection 
model, both would have evoked the rational basis or minimal 
scrutiny test since neither case involved a fundamental right or 
suspect c lass i f i~at ion.~~ Although the statute's rationality was 
discussed in Murry, the Court based its decision on the due pro- 
cess clause and applied a standard that approached the perfect 
fit standard of V l a n d i ~ . ~ ~  In Jimenez, the Court nominally applied 
- - -  
Modest Role for Equal Protection?, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV. 90-91, 93-108. 
44. See Gunther, Newer Equal Protection 8. 
45. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Gunther, Newer Equal 
Protection 8-10. 
46. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 258 (1974); Shapiro v. 
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,634 (1969); Barrett, A More Modest Role 105-06; Gunther, Newer 
Equal Protection 8-10. 
47. See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (school financ- 
ing); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) (aid to  families with dependent children); 
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971) (social security); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 
U.S. 471 (1970) (aid to families with dependent children). 
48. The Burger Court's retreat from the Warren Court's use of strict scrutiny review 
to achieve a new social order has been criticized: "The philosopher kings are in the caves 
and the new positivist justices are busy correlating means to ends with their rational basis 
tools." 43 U.M.K.C.L. REV. 248 (1974). On the other hand, it has been noted that interven- 
tionist use of strict scrutiny review as well as irrebuttable presumption review would 
"mandate rule by legislatures composed of philosopher-kings, or if they cannot be found, 
rule by federal district judges." Dixon, The "New" Substantive Due Process and the 
Democratic Ethic: A Prolegomenon, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV. 80. 
49. 413 U.S. 508 (1973). 
50. 417 U.S. 628 (1974). 
51. In Jimenez, the Court struck down a scheme distributing social security benefits 
inequitably between different groups of illegitimate children. Since the statute discrimi- 
nated between classes of illegitimates, no suspect classification singling out illegitimates 
as a class was involved. 417 U.S. a t  631-32, 635-36. The Murry majority based its holding 
entirely upon the due process clause, disregarding potential equal protection issues of 
fundamental rights or suspect criteria. 413 U.S. a t  509-514. 
52. See 413 U.S. a t  514. 
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the rational basis test. In reality, however, the Court employed 
an unarticulated but clearly heightened standard of scrutiny re- 
quiring a nearly perfect means-ends re la t i~nsh ip .~~  
Although the Court has not extended fundamental right sta- 
tus t~ welfare and social security payments, it has, through the 
irrebuttable presumption doctrine, applied a stricter standard to 
such legislation than the traditional minimal scrutiny of equal 
protection review. In other areas as well, the Court's dissatis- 
faction with two-tiered equal protection has produced strong 
dissents54 and aberrant results.55 According to most commenta- 
t o r ~ , ~ ~  the deviations are evidence that the Court is searching 
for alternatives to the traditional model. Use of the irrebuttable 
presumption doctrine within the usual equal protection domain 
is attributable to that search. 
The district court, relying on Vlandis, Stanley, and LaFleur, 
found section 416 to create an irrebuttable presumption that all 
short-lived marriages are shams for the purpose of obtaining so- 
cial security payments.57 It found that the section's purpose was 
to deny payments to those persons who married solely to obtain 
53. See 417 U S .  a t  636-37. In Justice Rehnquist's discussion of the Jimenez Court's 
"perplexing three-legged stool" basis for decision, id. a t  638-41 (dissenting opinion), he 
states: 
The holding is clearly founded in notions of equal protection . . . . Yet the 
opinion has strong due process overtones as well, at  times appearing to pay 
homage to the still novel, and I think insupportable, theory that "irrebuttable 
presumptions" violate due process. 
Id. a t  638. 
54. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655-77 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); 
San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70-137 (1973) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 456-59 (1973) (White, J., concurring). 
55. See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 
636 (1975); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La- 
Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 
(1973); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); Vlandisv. Kline, 
412 U.S. 441 (1973); McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 
U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Some of these cases are reviewed in 
the authorities cited in note 56 infra. 
56. See, e.g., G. GUNTHER, CONST~TIONAL LAW 661-63, 769-78, 875-76; Gunther, 
Newer Equal Protection 12, 18-20; Forum: Equal Protection and the Burger Court, 2 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 645, 654,658-60 (1975); Comment, "Newer" Equal Protection: The 
Impact of the Means-Focused Model, 23 BUFF. L. REV. 665, 666-69 (1974). Note, The 
Emerging Bifurcated Standard for Classifications Based on Sex, 1975 DUKE L.J. 163, 164, 
170-77. 
57. 373 F. Supp. 961, 965 (N.D. Cal. 1974). 
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benefits.5R Although the legislative goal was legitimate, the 9- 
month classification used by Congress was not a universally valid 
indicator that the marriage had been entered into to obtain social 
security benefits, and thus violated due process.5g 
In reversing, the Supreme Court distinguished the three 
cases relied on by the district court. Stanley and LaFleur were 
characterized as involving fundamental rights requiring height- 
ened scrutiny; Vlandis was distinguished on its factsY Then, 
instead of applying the mechanical irrebuttable presumption 
analysis employed by the district court, the Court applied the 
minimal scrutiny equal protection standard traditionally used in 
the economic and welfare areasY Relying on several "old"R2 equal 
protection cases,63 the Court stated the test to be whether there 
was some rational relation between the classification and a legiti- 
mate purpose.64 Ignoring the degree of precision in the classifica- 
tion, which would have been a t  issue in an irrebuttable presump- 
tion analysis, the Court determined that the classification had 
the required rational basis.65 Consequently, the duration-of- 
relationship requirements of section 416" were held to be consti- 
tutionally sound. 
Almost any equal protection issue can be analyzed in irre- 
buttable presumption terms; likewise, most irrebutable presump- 
tion cases can be decided under equal protection analysis." Most 
58. Id. The Social Security Act's legislative history supports this conclusion of the 
district court. See H.R. REP. NO. 92-231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1971); H.R. REP. NO. 
544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1967); H.R. REP. NO. 2526, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1946). 
59. 373 F. Supp. at 965-66. 
60. 422 U.S. a t  771-72. See notes 85-93 and accompanying text infra. 
61. 422 U.S. a t  768-70, 772. In declining to treat welfare payments as fundamental 
rights, the Court stated that "a noncontractual claim to receive funds from the public 
treasury enjoys no constitutionally protected status." Id. at 772. 
62. "Old" refers to the traditional minimal scrutiny without "bite," as opposed to 
"new" and "newer" equal protection. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL L W 657-63; 
Gunther, Newer Equal Protection 8-24. 
63. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 
U.S. 483 (1955); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Kotch v. Board of River Port 
Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947); Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 
61 (1913); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). 
64. 422 U.S. a t  777. 
65. Id. a t  780-85. 
66. Note 1 supra. 
67. See Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 
HARV. L. REV. 1534, 1548 (1974); Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 
27 STAN. L. REV. 449, 463-65 (1975). 
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classificatory legislation distributes benefits or burdens une- 
qually; thus, it is subject to an equal protection attack since the 
distinction allocating the benefits or burdens may arguably be 
irrational or invidious. Similarly, classificatory legislation creates 
a conclusive presumption since possession of the classifying char- 
acteristic presumes inclusion in or exclusion from the class that 
the legislature sought to affect. If the classifying characteristic 
chosen by the legislature does not perfectly describe the target 
group, the legislation may be attacked as violating the due pro- 
cess clause.6s This doctrinal interchangeability produces prob- 
lems related both to the interchange possibility itself and to the 
analytical weaknesses of the doctrines involved. 
A. Problems Occasioned by the 
Interchangeability of Doctrines 
1. Manipulation of outcome 
Although either doctrine can be applied in a given case, the 
choice often determines outcome. The perfect fit requirement of 
the irrebuttable presumption doctrine is much more demanding 
than the equal protection minimal scrutiny test and probably is 
a t  least as demanding as the strict scrutiny test." A fundamental 
right or suspect classification is necessary to raise the scrutiny 
from minimal to strict in equal protection a n a l a y ~ i s , ~ ~  whereas 
conclusive presumption analysis never deals with the nature of 
the interest affected (fundamental right) or the nature of the 
criteria used to classify (suspect classification) since it looks only 
to the degree of precision of the classification chosen in achieving 
the legislative purpose. Thus, when cases such as Salfi7' present 
a choice between the rational basis test of equal protection and 
the exacting perfect fit test of the conclusive presumption doc- 
trine, courts determine outcome when they select the doctrine to 
apply. The result is that unprincipled doctrinal choices effect 
decisions on the equities. 
68. See notes 4-9 and accompanying text supra. 
69. Cf. note 89 infra. 
70. See notes 42-45 and accompanying text supra. 
71. Jimenez and Murry also involved economic legislation, allowing the Court to 
choose between the traditional minimal scrutiny and the perfect fit test of the irrebuttable 
presumption doctrine. Given the choice, the Court avoided minimal scrutiny in Jimenez 
and Murry. See notes 49-53 and accompanying text supra. 
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2. Manipulation of remedy 
The interchange possibility also allows courts to control the 
remedy to be granted. When an equal protection attack succeeds, 
the court invalidates the l eg i s l a t i~n .~~  If the court finds that the 
statute creates an  unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption, 
however, the usual result is an individualized hearing to deter- 
mine whether the statutory classification accurately reflects the 
legislative purpose as applied to the claimant. In effect, the pre- 
sumption becomes rebuttable .73 
Scholars disagree on the effectiveness of individualized hear- 
ings in guaranteeing individual rights. One commentator views 
the individualized hearing remedy as a tool that can effectively 
nullify legislative policy choices; requiring the extreme proce- 
dural burden of an individualized hearing may render certain 
legislation impossible to adrnini~ter. '~ In contrast, another scholar 
considers the individualized hearing to be a hollow remedy since 
the onerous law remains in force, subject only to a hearing in 
which the individual bears the burden of showing that none of the 
conceivable purposes of the statute apply in his case.75 A court 
could, therefore, thwart vindication of individual rights by grant- 
ing the illusory remedy of an individualized hearing to plaintiffs 
who successfully prosecute irrebuttable presumption claims. 
3. Evasion of significant equal protection issues 
The irrebuttable presumption doctrine is an inadequate sub- 
stitute for the equal protection doctrine. Besides distorting the 
outcome that may have been reached under an equal protection 
72. Bezanson, Some Thoughts on the Emerging Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine, 
7 IND. L. REV. 644, 646-47 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Bezanson, Emerging Doctrine]. 
73. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U S .  441, 445-46 (1973); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 
(1971). The individualized hearing remedy is awarded in irrebuttable presumption cases 
since the doctrine speaks in evidentiary and procedural due process terms. See note 11 
supra. What is sought through the individualized hearing is an exception to the statute. 
But even a judicial finding that legislation violates procedural due process does not result 
in specific exemptions from legislation; rather, due process requires a hearing to determine 
only whether the complainant is accurately classified according to the law. If so, no 
exemption is granted. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U S .  254, 267 (1970). Moreover, legislation 
attacked under the due process void-for-vagueness doctrine, which requires certainty in 
statutory definition of proscribed conduct and result, cannot be saved through individual- 
ized hearings. Such legislation must be redrafted until it gives sufficient notice as required 
by due process. See Bezanson, Emerging Doctrine 654-55 & n.31; Note, The Void-for- 
Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960). 
74. Dixon, The "New" Substantive Due Process and the Democratic Ethic: A 
Prolegomenon, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV. 79-80. 
75. Bezanson, Emerging Doctrine 655-58, 660. 
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a n a l y ~ i s , ~ '  the mechanical application of the irrebuttable pre- 
sumption doctrine permits the court to evade significant equal 
protection issues. This is the most serious problem caused by the 
interchangeability of the two doctrines. The recent Supreme 
Court cases decided on conclusive presumption grounds were 
equally susceptible to equal protection review; each would have 
forced the Court to confront significant questions regarding the 
breadth of fundamental rights and suspect classes.77 The question 
the Court should be pursuing is not whether the case involves an 
irrebuttable presumption or equal protection claim, but whether 
the legislature constitutionally may so affect the individual rights 
a t  stake. This requires an analysis of the importance and extent 
of deprivation of the individual's interests weighed against the 
state's interests in enacting the classificatory legislation. Such an 
analysis is required by the equal protection doctrine, but veiled 
by the irrebuttable presumption doctrine.78 
B. The Impact of Salfi on the Irrebuttable Presumption 
Doctrine 
In Salfi, by finding the challenged legislation subject only to 
a minimal scrutiny equal protection test instead of an irrebut- 
table presumption test, the Court has restricted the irrebuttable 
presumption doctrine's application. Both the Court's intention to 
limit the doctrine and the extent of the limitation are evident 
from the Court's characterization of the previous irrebuttable 
presumption cases. 
According to the Court's characterization of Stanley and 
LaFleur, those cases required a heightened standard of review 
because they respectively involved the fundamental rights to 
"conceive and to raise one's children" and "personal choice in 
76. See notes 69-71 and accompanying text supra. 
77. Basing the decisions on the due process clause and and using conclusive presump- 
tion analysis, the Court avoided the illegitimate and sex-based classification issues in 
Stanley, the sex-based classification issue in LaFleur, the right-to-travel and right-to- 
education issues in Vlandis, and the right-to-basic-sustenance issue in Murry. These are 
substantial issues with which the Court has previously struggled but which may still be 
in flux. A discussion of Stanley, LaFleur, Vlandis, and Murry and the issues avoided in 
each can be found in Bezanson, Emerging Doctrine 648-51. 
78. Cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U S .  632, 651-52 (1974) (Powell, J., 
concurring). Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Murry illustrates his agreement with Professor 
Wigmore that there are no true conclusive evidentiary presumptions; such devices are 
substantive rules of law. Justice Rehnquist states: "Thus we deal not with the law of 
evidence, but with the extent to which the Fifth Amendment permits this Court to invali- 
date such a determination by Congress." 413 U S .  a t  524. Compare id. with 4 J. WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE 5 1353 (Chadbourn rev. 1972); 9 J. WIGMORE, VIDENCE § 2492 (3d Ed. 1940). 
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matters of marriage and family life."7g Actually, although the 
Court in Stanley had indicated that parental rights were of such 
significance that they were protected by due process  guarantee^,^^ 
the heightened standard of equal protection review arose, not 
from fundamental parental rights, but from the right not to be 
denied due process when an important interest is at  stake? 
Moreover, the body of the Court's opinion in Stanley concerned 
the statutory conclusive presumption, which the Court found re- 
pugnant to the due process clause.82 In LaFleur, the issue of the 
nature of the right involved, which determines the standard of 
equal protection analysis, was entirely evaded through the use of 
the irrebuttable presumption doctrineeS3 
To distinguish Vlandis, the Court stated that Vlandis held 
that 
where Connecticut purported to be concerned with residency, it 
might not a t  the same time deny to one seeking to meet its test 
of residency the opportunity to show factors clearly bearing on 
that issue .u4 
As the dissent points however, the Salfi situation can be 
characterized in exactly the same language if "marriage validity" 
is substituted for "residency" in the above quotation. 
By redefining the recent irrebuttable presumption cases as 
involving strict scrutiny,86 the Court has a t  least limited the irre- 
79. 422 U.S. a t  771. 
80. 405 U.S. a t  651. 
81. The Court reasoned that parental interests were important interests protected by 
due process. Since the statute granted due process rights only to married fathers, i t  
discriminated against unmarried fathers by denying them the fundamental right to due 
process and was subject to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause. Id. a t  658; 
see notes 18-23 and accompanying text supra. 
82. 405 U.S. a t  652-58. 
83. 414 U.S. a t  644-46, 651. The Court found personal choice in matters of marriage 
and family life to be one of the liberties protected by the due process clause, id. a t  639- 
40, but did not analyze the issues in equal protection language. 
84. 422 U.S. a t  771. The Court used essentially the same approach in a later discus- 
sion of Vlandis, id. a t  772. 
85. 422 U.S. a t  803 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan reasoned: "The defin- 
tions of 'resident' were precisely parallel to the statute here, which defines 'widow' and 
'child' in part by the number of months of marriage . . . ." Id. 
86. See notes 79-85 and accompanying text supra for the Court's characterizations 
of Stanley, LaFleur, and Vlandis. Murry was distinguished as involving legislation not 
even meeting the lower tier equal protection standard of rationality. 422 U.S. a t  772. 
Murry, however, was not decided on the basis of the equal protection minimal scrutiny 
test, but on the basis of the due process clause. 413 U.S. a t  514; see Lavine v. Milne, 44 
U.S.L.W. 4295, 4298 n.9 (U.S. Mar. 3, 1976) (citing Murry as a conclusive presumption 
case). In either event, it is certainly arguable that denying food stamps to one who is a 
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buttable presumption doctrine and the attendant individualized 
hearing remedy to only those cases involving suspect classifica- 
tions or fundamental rights. In fact, the restriction may be more 
severe than that, sincedhe procrustean attempt to fit the recent 
irrebuttable presumption cases into the traditional equal protec- 
tion framework, especially when the fit is so strained, displays the 
Court's strong desire to return to equal protection analysis in such 
cases. 
In light of the problems encountered in applying the conclu- 
sive presumption do~trine,~ '  the return to exclusive use of the 
equal protection doctrine in these cases would be a welcome shift. 
As a result of Salfi, difficult equal protection questions which 
have evaded review through the application of conclusive pre- 
sumption analysis must now be treated by the Unprinci- 
pled decisions on the equities, which the interchangeability be- 
tween doctrines and the formulary application of irrebuttable 
presumption analysis allowed, will now be restricted. 
C. The Impact of Salfi on the Equal Protection Doctrine 
As previously noted, the Court's description of Stanley and 
LaFleur as involving fundamental rights implies that irrebut- 
table presumption analysis may be appropriate in strict scrutiny 
situations. If that is the case, the Court, given the facility of 
finding conclusive presumptions in most legislation, will be faced 
dependent of another is a t  least as rational as denying social security death benefits to a 
surviving spouse married less than 9 months prior to the death of the partner. 
Bell, Carrington, and Stanley have sometimes been cited as involving the equal 
protection clause: Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 457-58 (1973) (White, J., concurring); 
id. a t  461 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 771 (1975). They 
are also cited as based on the due process clause: Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 
U.S. 632, 645 (1974); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 514 
(1973). 
87. See notes 69-78 and accompanying text supra; Bezanson, Emerging Doctrine; 
Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. REV. 
1534 (1974); Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 449 
(1975). But see Tribe, From Environmental Foundations to Constitutional Structures: 
Learning From Nature's Future, 84 YALE L.J. 545 (1975), arguing that individual determi- 
nations are useful to promote the formation of a new social consensus regarding the values 
underlying challenged legislation when those values are in flux. Professor Tribe approves 
of Stanley and LaFleur because they involved legislation based on outdated moral values 
which were yet evolving. By requiring individualized hearings, the Court achieved person- 
alized justice in settings of widely perceived moral flux and contributed to the establish- 
ment of a new social consensus. I t  is emphasized that the governmental agency controlling 
the decisionmaking was in a position to prevent the emergence of a new social consensus. 
Id. a t  554-55. 
88. See text accompanying notes 76-78 supra. 
5651 CASE NOTES 581 
with selecting between the "necessarily true" and "compelling 
state interest" standards as well as determining which remedy, 
individualized hearings or invalidation, would be more appropri- 
ate. Although the existence of a significant difference between the 
two standards is ques t i~nab le ,~~  the difference between the two 
remedies may be s u b ~ t a n t i a l . ~ ~  
Salfi has also affected the lower tier of equal protection anal- 
ysis. In three recent pre-Salfi casesg1 in the food stamp and social 
security areas, the Court applied three different standards of 
scrutiny, each more demanding than the minimal scrutiny stan- 
dard usually applied.g2 In light of those cases and the pre-Salfi 
acceptance of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine, one com- 
mentatorg~uestioned the viability of the minimal scrutiny tradi- 
tion in the welfare area. By refusing to follow the recent devia- 
tions from the model, however, the Salfi Court retreated from 
stricter equal protection review of welfare legislation. The Salfi 
opinion, while undermining the irrebuttable presumption doc- 
trine, also indicates that the level of minimal scrutiny for welfare 
89. In Vlandis, the Court tempered the perfect fit requirement by emphasizing the 
availability of reasonable alternative means of making the factual determination pre- 
sumed by the statute. 412 U.S. at  451-52. While not requiring a perfect fit between means 
and ends, the compelling state interest test does require that the state use the means that 
are least burdensome to the rights affected. Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 
250, 267, 269 (1974). The two tests may, therefore, be very close, since if a legislature 
creates a conclusive presumption when reasonable alternatives means for making the 
factual determination are available, it has obviously not chosen the means least burden- 
some to the affected rights. 
90. See notes 74-75 and accompanying text supra; cf .  Tribe, Structural Due Process, 
10 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 269, 303-10 (1975) (individualized decisionmaking 
would be preferred when the legislation's underlying values are in flux and when the 
enforcing governmental body is in a position to prevent the emergence of an alternative 
social consensus); Tribe, From Environmental Foundations to Constitutional Structures: 
Learning from Nature's Future, 84 YALE. L.J. 545,552-55 (1975) (approving of Stanley and 
LaFleur); note 87 supra. 
91. In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975), the Court held that it was a 
denial of equal protection to provide social security benefits to surviving children and a 
surviving wife if an insured husband died, whereas if an insured wife died, only the 
surviving children received survivors' benefits. Without reaching the issue of whether the 
sex-based classification was suspect, the Court scrutinized the offered justifications for the 
distinction and found them insufficient. The presumption of validity normally given legis- 
lation under minimal scrutiny review apparently was not employed. 
Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) is reviewed in notes 50, 51, 53 and 
accompanying text supra. 
United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) is reviewed in notes 
28-31, 49, 51, 52, 86 and accompanying text supra. 
92. See note 91 supra; G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 774-75 (reviewing 
Wiesenfield), 849 (reviewing Murry), 872-74 (reviewing Jimenez), 891 (reviewing Murry). 
93. Bezanson, Emerging Doctrine 653 n.27. 
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legislation may return to the near nonscrutiny of "old" equal 
protection. For example, t h e  Court states: 
[Tlhe question raised is not whether a statutory provision pre- 
cisely filters out those, and only those, who are in the factual 
position which generated the congressional concern . . . . Nor 
is the question whether the provision filters out a substantial 
part of the class . . . or whether it filters out more members of 
the class than nonmembers. The question is whether Congress 
. . . could rationally have concluded both that a particular limi- 
tation or qualification would protect against its occurrence, and 
that the expense and other difficulties of individual determina- 
tions justified the inherent imprecision of a prophylactic rulesg4 
The majority's censure of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine 
is clear. However, the Court strains the definition of "rational" 
when it suggests that a classification that fails more than i t  suc- 
ceeds in defining the desired class may be upheld as rational.g5 
While it has not produced perfect order from chaos, the re- 
striction of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine in Salfi should 
produce added clarity in equal protection review since the Court 
can no longer retreat from difficult equal protection analysis via 
the irrebuttable presumption doctrine. At the same time, how- 
ever, it is unfortunate that the province of strict scrutiny is now 
overcrowded with two tests and remedies, and that manipulation 
of the rationality standard continues as the norm in minimal 
scrutiny review. 
94. 422 U.S. at 777. 
95. The pliability of the definition of "rational" is unsettling, especially when the 
Court determines rationality in reference to a legislative purpose selected by the Court. 
See note 7 supra. Compare Salfi (extreme deference to the legislature) with In re Estate 
of Cavill, 329 A.2d 503 (Pa. 1974) (finding a statute that was overinclusive and underinclu- 
sive as the terms are used in irrebuttable presumption analysis to be irrational, thereby 
failing "minimal" equal protection scrutiny); cf.  Shaman, The Rule of Reasonableness in 
Constitutional Adjudication: Toward the End of Irresponsible Judicial Review and the 
Establishment of a Viable Theory of the Equal Protection Clause, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
153,161-71 (1975); Note, Legislative Purposes, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE 
L.J. 123, 154 (1972). 
